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Abstract
The Air and Space Interoperability Council (ASIC) has adopted the European Defence Agency (EDA) process for inter-
regulatory military airworthiness authority recognition. However, there are gaps in the application of this process to nations 
outside of the European Union. This paper proposes a model that can effectively map diverse technical airworthiness 
regulatory frameworks. This model, referred to as the Product-Behaviour-Process (PBP) Bow-Tie model, provides the 
systematic structure needed to represent and compare regulatory frameworks. The PBP Bow-Tie model identifies key points 
of difference that need to be addressed, during inter-agency recognition between the two regulatory authorities. With the 
intention to adopt global use of the EDA process, the proposed PBP Bow-Tie model can be used as a basis for the successful 
recognition of regulatory frameworks outside of the European Union. Iris plots produced from the implementation of this 
model are presented, and proposed as a suitable means of illustrating the outcome of an assessment, and of supporting the 
comparisons of results. A comparative analysis of the Australian Defence Force and New Zealand Defence Force airworthiness 
regulatory frameworks is used as a case study. The case study clearly illustrates the effectiveness of the model in discerning 
regulatory framework differences; moreover, it has offered an opportunity to explore the limitations of the Iris plot. 
Key words:  airworthiness, military aviation, military airworthiness authority, regulations, assessment framework, mutual 
recognition, bow-tie model. 
1. Introduction
Having to comply with a number of disparate military 
regulatory requirements imposes “unsustainable” costs on 
the European Defence industry [1]. In response, the Military 
AirWorthiness Authorities (MAWA) forum was established in 
2008 by the European Defence Agency (EDA), with the aim 
of harmonizing national military airworthiness regulations 
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within the European Union (EU) [2]. The long term goal is 
to establish a single military airworthiness regulatory system 
for all EU countries [3]. Achieving this goal requires [3]: 
1. A common regulatory framework;
2. a common certification processes;
3. a common approach to organizational approvals;
4. common certification/design codes;
5.  a common approach to the preservation of 
airworthiness;
6. arrangements for mutual recognition; and,
7.  the formation of a European Military Joint 
Airworthiness Authorities Organization. 
Largely mirroring the civil aviation (namely the European 
Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)) approach and structure, 
it was agreed that a common set of European Military 
Airworthiness Requirements (EMARs), Acceptable Means 
of Compliance (AMC), and Guidance Material (GM) should 
be developed, accepted, and implemented into national 
regulation by all EDA members [2]. Recently, the EMARs 
Parts 1, 21, 66, 145, and 147 (EMAR Part M, still under 
development), and the European Military Airworthiness 
Document – Recognition (EMAD-R), have been released. 
The EMARs are largely consistent with the EASA framework, 
and allow for military specific requirements. The EMAD-R 
details an agreed process for the recognition of other Military 
Airworthiness Authorities (MAAs), in terms of authority, 
certification, and approval of products and organizations, 
based on the EMARs [4].
Mutual recognition facilitates gains and improved 
efficiencies in all MAA interfaces with other MAAs, and their 
regulatory frameworks. The current global military focus 
for recognition is technical. Significant work on mutual 
recognition is being undertaken by the EDA, through the 
EMAD-R process, and within ASIC through an Airworthiness 
Working Group, which comprises of representatives from 
the United States Department of Defence (US DoD), 
United Kingdom Ministry of Defence (UK MoD), Canadian 
Department of National Defence, and Australian and New 
Zealand Departments of Defence. The EDA has finalized 
the first mutual recognition for Part 145 requirements 
(Maintenance Organizations) of the Airbus A400M between 
the UK and France. Similarly, ASIC have adopted the 
EMAD-R process, with the first recognition activity carried 
out between the UK MAA and United States Army for mutual 
recognition, primarily for type certification purposes (as part 
of the AH-64D Apache helicopter acquisition by the UK), 
as well as for personnel safety flying on US Army/UK MoD 
operated aircraft [5]. 
There is one primary difference between the approaches 
for mutual recognition being pursued by the EDA and 
ASIC. This is the reason for the EMAD-R process not being 
directly transferrable, although it was adopted by the ASIC 
[6]. The EMAD-R mutual recognition relies on the consistent 
application of, or known compliance with, the EMARs. No 
such consistent airworthiness application is likely to occur 
within the ASIC, nor with MAAs outside the EU. Even further, 
it is unlikely that, at least in the near future, non-EU MAAs 
will develop compliance with the EMARs. This is in part 
motivated by significant cost (in regulation, education, 
oversight, and enforcement changes), with as yet limited 
non-EU motivation. Greater global implementation of the 
EMARs will provide added motivation. For this reason, 
an alternate method of recognition, or a framework for 
supporting the process described in the EMAD-R, is 
necessary. The motivation for this initiative is validated by 
simply examining the level of complexity and non-coherence 
across the different MAAs around the world [6].
This paper highlights the effective utilization of the 
Product-Behavior-Process (PBP) Bow-Tie model, proposed 
by Purton et al. [7] for filling the gap for non-EMAR countries. 
The PBP Bow-Tie model [7] is a specific, modified application 
of the conventional bow-tie [8-16], which is normally used 
for risk management and accident analysis. Importantly, no 
other assessment models or methodologies for regulatory 
frameworks have been identified in the literature, making 
this derivation and application unique. The PBP Bow-Tie 
model provides a structure for the systematic representation 
and analysis of disparate airworthiness regulatory systems. 
The model facilitates the identification of test points within 
the regulatory framework, which are to be answered by 
each MAA. The test point answers are used as a basis for 
comparing, and eventually assessing, two (or more) different 
regulatory frameworks. This assessment is supported 
through a framework assuming that technical integrity is 
assured by three key components: Product, Behavior, and 
Process (PBP) integrity.
A baseline assessment can be formed that supports the 
EMAD-R process, making it suitable for all airworthiness 
bodies, civil or military. A detailed explanation of the model, 
and the rationale behind it is provided in [7]; however, a 
summary is offered in the following section. The recognition 
process between the Australian Defence Force (ADF) 
and New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) is assessed, and 
demonstrated as an exemplar case. 
2. Derivation of the PBP Bow-Tie model
The basic layout of the PBP Bow-Tie model structure is 
illustrated in Fig. 1, and may be explained briefly as follows. 
DOI:10.5139/IJASS.2014.15.1.54 56
Int’l J. of Aeronautical & Space Sci. 15(1), 54–62 (2014)
Conventional Bow-Tie models in aviation safety are utilized 
to assess the barriers in place, to reduce the likelihood, or 
reduce the consequence of a potential hazard, triggered by a 
specific event [8-16]. In the PBP Bow-Tie model, the primary 
hazard or “top event” is the loss of technical integrity [7]. 
Technical integrity can be maintained through assuring 
product, behaviour, and process (PBP) integrity [7, 17]. 
These three elements establish a set of threat lines (or causal 
scenarios) potentially leading to a loss of technical integrity, 
and in turn, potential loss events.  
Barriers can be put in place to reduce the likelihood of 
any of the threat lines eventuating. Within the technical 
item lifecycle, there are three distinct activities: design, 
production, and maintenance. Barriers can be grouped 
in relation to these three activities. Barriers can also be 
grouped as preventative measures, i.e. those put in place to 
reduce the likelihood of losing technical integrity (grouped 
on the left-hand side of the PBP model, Fig. 1), and reactive 
measures (grouped on the right-hand side of the PBP model, 
Fig. 1), which aim to reduce the likelihood of consequential 
outcomes, given a loss of technical integrity. The proactive 
management of airworthiness places an emphasis on the 
preventative barriers; whilst, reactive management would 
have a stronger emphasis on reductive barriers.  
Each barrier represents a specific regulatory process 
or “test point” that is undertaken within each of the high-
level technical lifecycle activities. For example, a test point 
may be that there is a standard set for aircraft maintenance 
processes. An attestation is made at each of these test points, 
verifying that there has been a judgment of acceptability at 
each test point, before the regulatory process proceeds to the 
next activity in the technical lifecycle. Threat paths describe 
those situations where there have been a series of incorrect 
attestations. This is shown in Fig. 2.  
The PBP Bow-Tie model test points are scored, utilizing 
an independence metric. The independence categories 
utilized to distinguish the different levels for attestations 
within a regulatory framework are presented in Table 1. 
Fig. 1.  Composition of the bow-tie framework, overlapped with the technical integrity definition and technical item lifecycle. This paper is focused 
on preventative barriers, shown on the left-hand side of this figure.
Fig. 2.  Breakdown of the steps required for attestations of acceptability, during the lifecycle of an item.
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Independence was selected as the appropriate metric, due to 
the influence organizational and environmental factors have 
on human decision-making, which can lead to direct errors, 
the introduction of latent errors (the work of James Reason 
[18-20]) or safety drift (the work of Rasmussen [21, 22]). For 
this reason, independent regulators have been established 
in fields in which there is required to be a primacy on 
safety (aviation, medicine, and food hygiene, for example). 
Measuring each test point identifies where there is regulator 
interaction, and therefore identifies where there is a primacy 
on safety. The independence categories, when applied to 
each test point within the PBP Bow-Tie model, facilitate a 
picture (Iris plot) of an individual regulatory framework. Iris 
plots provide a concise means of visualizing the different 
factors that contribute to the technical regulatory framework, 
as well as facilitating direct comparison between different 
technical regulatory frameworks. In this case, the focus is on 
the technical regulations; but the framework and metrics are 
transferrable to any regulatory framework or process, which 
can be either operational or technical. The implementation 
of the model in a two-party recognition exercise is presented 
in the next part of this paper. 
3. Implementation of the PBP Bow-Tie model
The PBP Bow-Tie assessment process is illustrated in 
the flowchart shown in Fig. 3. The process of assessment is 
efficient, when carried out with a knowledgeable member 
within the military airworthiness regulator, who can 
identify the organisations and appropriate attestation levels. 
Conducting the assessment is the first part of developing a 
comparison picture that is capable of informing recognition. 
The two outputs that enable the comparison are the Iris 
plots, detailed in this section, and the gathered evidence, 
detailed in Section 4.
The PBP Bow-Tie model was developed to facilitate 
recognition outside of the EU. It has arisen due to a 
requirement for known compliance with the EMARs within 
the EMAD-R process. Due to geographical proximity, the 
ADF and NZDF (two of the ASIC nations) established a 
recognition agreement to serve two purposes. These were 
firstly, progress recognition within ASIC, following the UK 
MAA and US Army recognition activity; and secondly, to 
establish the suitability of the PBP Bow-Tie as a method of 
comparing regulatory frameworks for countries not on the 
EMARs. This assessment provides a methodology to assess, 
and then compare, high-level regulatory frameworks. 
Different elements of the airworthiness framework can 
be assessed, by scoping the assessment to design (or 
Table 1.  Independence metric for the PBP Bow-Tie model assessment. 
Scores greater than three indicate regulator interaction.
16 
Fig. 3. Flowchart of the PBP Bow-Tie assessment process for regulatory framework comparison. 
Fig. 3. Flowchart of the PBP Bow-Tie assessment process for regulatory framework comparison.
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certification), production, or maintenance (operations).
The implementation of the model for the ADF and the 
NZDF comparison produced two Iris plots, which are 
presented in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 respectively. As described in 
[7], the visualization of the output from the PBP Bow Tie 
model can be represented graphically, using Iris plots. The 
Iris plot can be constructed based on different groupings 
of the data, either by integrity threat line, or by technical 
Fig. 4. The ADF Iris plot symmetrical comparison grouped by technical activity. This Iris plot indicates a largely symmetrical regulatory framework.
Fig. 5.  The NZDF Iris plot symmetrical comparison grouped by technical activity. This Iris plot indicates that the NZDF regulatory framework pro-
vides different regulatory requirements for Defence and Defence Industry.
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lifecycle activity. The result is two distinct plots of the results 
of the application of the PBP Bow Tie. Each plot displays the 
same information, but can reveal different subtleties within 
a regulatory framework. The first representation of the model 
output is based on the technical lifecycle activity. In this 
paper, the assessment is extended to compare regulatory 
framework intricacies for Defence, and Defence Industry 
[7]. It is important to distinguish these two sectors of military 
aviation, since each regulatory framework integrates them 
distinctly. In Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 the PBP Bow-Tie model scores 
for Defence are shown on the right-hand side, and for the 
Defence Industry (design, production, or maintenance 
performed under contract), are shown on the left-hand side. 
Each radial corresponds to a test point within a technical 
lifecycle activity (e.g. design, manufacture, maintain), and 
the length of the radial is the independence score assigned 
to that test point. The radials are shaded, to further assist 
visualization of the independence. As per the scale of Table 
1, attestations made by a partially independent regulator 
(internal), or a fully independent (external/legislative) 
regulator, correspond to an independence score of greater 
than three. This is illustrated on the Iris plot by scores greater 
than the purple ring, which is aligned at three.
Analysis of the Iris plots for the ADF and NZDF highlight 
areas of difference; for instance, as can be seen in Fig. 4, 
the ADF has strong process control within aircraft and 
aeronautical product design and maintenance, while there 
is limited oversight of production activities. From Fig. 5, it 
can be observed that the NZDF relies on the Civil Aviation 
Authority for oversight of the Defence Industry maintenance 
organizations, and like the ADF, has limited oversight of 
production activities. 
A systematic basis for comparison between the two 
regulatory frameworks is needed, in order to enable inter-
agency recognition. An inter-agency recognition process 
should address any identified differences between these 
two frameworks. Test point scores with differences of two 
(judged as significantly different) or greater within their 
scores, or alternatively, only one country, indicate regulator 
interaction for a test point. 
4. Comparison of Regulatory Frameworks
A brief overview of the differences between Defence and 
Defence Industry is provided in the following sections. These 
differences are not outlined to prove that one regulatory 
framework is better than the other, but to identify where there 
are areas to be addressed, as part of the establishment of a 
process of mutual recognition between the ADF and NZDF. 
A detailed comparison of the Iris plots generated for the two 
regulatory frameworks is performed. This comparison is first 
made based on the activities undertaken by the Defence 
regulator (Fig. 6), and then on the activities outsourced to the 
Fig. 6.  The ADF and NZDF technical regulatory framework comparison for Defence. The symmetrical differences indicate areas requiring examina-
tion, during recognition efforts.
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Defence Industry (Fig. 7). 
4.1  Regulatory framework differences for Defence 
Organizations
From Fig. 6 it can be observed that there a number 
of differences in the test points scores for the regulatory 
interaction by the ADF and NZDF. The ADF issues 
organizational approvals, and conducts compliance with 
regulations, and conformance to processes (indicated by 
the series of scores of four for design and maintenance 
process). The NZDF does not issue organization approvals, 
and only conducts conformance to the NZDF accepted 
engineering and maintenance publications. The ADF does 
not offer regulatory controls for supply; while, the NZDF 
defines the product acceptability requirements for supplied 
product (indicated by the regulator interaction at TP1.6 
(supply in design)) and TP3.6 ((supply in maintenance) for 
the NZDF). The NZDF sets the required training standards 
for maintainers as a regulatory function, but does not make a 
formal attestation of acceptability. The ADF does not set the 
required standards through regulations, but does require a 
formal attestation of acceptability (indicated by Behaviour 
attestations for maintenance). The amount of effort and time 
to generate the Iris plots is significantly less, than the work 
required through the existing process of conducting on-site 
interviews and assessments. The Iris plots are effectively a 
quick and easy-to-use tool, to identify differences between 
regulatory frameworks up-front, providing a streamlined 
optimized approach to mutual recognition projects.
4.2  Regulatory differences for contracted organiza-
tions
From Fig. 7 it can be observed that there a number of 
differences in the test points scores for the regulatory 
activities undertaken by contracted external organizations, 
on behalf of the ADF and NZDF. The NZDF relies on the 
New Zealand Civil Aviation Authority for oversight of 
design and maintenance organizations, which is subject 
to requirements for expositions [indicated by scores of five 
(external regulator)]. Both the design and maintenance 
organizations can still be subject to audits, to confirm 
there are no contraventions to the intent of the NZDF 
engineering and maintenance documents. The ADF 
treat Defence and the Defence Industry the same, with 
respect to exposition requirements. The NZDF require 
similar product acceptability requirements of the Defence 
Industry for supplied product. The ADF and NZDF 
are comparable for production oversight, with neither 
providing regulatory interaction for production; they both 
rely on other organizations to oversee production on their 
behalf.
A more detailed test-point to test-point comparison 
Fig. 7.  The ADF and NZDF technical regulatory framework comparison for Defence Industry. The symmetrical differences indicate areas requiring 
examination, during recognition efforts.
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can be carried out; that is, each segment of the Iris plot is 
symmetrically compared (i.e. TP1.4 (right-hand side) is 
compared to TP1.4I (left-hand side)), for the ADF and NZDF. 
As discussed, a difference in the respective independence 
scores of greater than two (i.e. three, one), or where the scores 
dictate that one service provides a regulatory attestation, 
and the other does not (i.e. four, three), warrant particular 
interest. Importantly, a greater independence does not 
indicate a better system, but the fact that there is a difference 
that warrants further examination. Due to the level of fidelity 
of the detailed comparison and defence security restrictions, 
the full analysis is not presented in this paper.
5. Iris plot limitations
There are points of interest extracted during the PBP 
Bow-Tie model interrogation of the test points that are not 
displayed visually in the Iris plot. For example, with regard 
to delegations of authority, one may note that most scores of 
three are from delegated authority; where a three indicates 
either a distinct management organization, or a person 
exercising a delegation of authority from the airworthiness 
authority. Both the ADF and NZDF utilize formal delegated 
authority from the Technical Airworthiness Authority (TAA), 
for design and maintenance decisions and attestations. The 
ADF has Design Acceptance Representatives (DARs), and 
the NZDF has Delegate Engineering Authority (DEA) issued 
to key personnel. Moreover, it has been shown that the Iris 
plot has no way of identifying the different organizations 
involved in the regulatory framework attestations. These 
limitations, however, can be covered during recognition 
dialogue, and analysis of the Iris plots.
6. Conclusion
The PBP Bow-Tie model implementation has demonstrated 
a method of comparing technical airworthiness regulatory 
frameworks for design, production, and maintenance. The 
comparison has identified areas of difference, and provided 
reasons and motivations for these differences, so that they 
can be understood, and accepted, or further investigated. 
It has provided a solid foundation for the next steps in the 
recognition process. 
There is a degree of uncertainty surrounding military 
airworthiness regulatory frameworks, especially when 
making comparisons between different regulatory 
frameworks. This uncertainty is compounded, when each 
of the Nations making the assessment are trying to assure 
that in recognizing the regulatory framework of another, 
they are not introducing any risks into their own regulatory 
framework. Therefore, in initiating recognition dialogue, a 
method of comparing technical airworthiness regulatory 
frameworks that have differing regulatory structure and 
policy is paramount. The PBP Bow-Tie model provides 
a generic and systematic mechanism for representing 
disparate regulatory frameworks. This model provides 
the common framework necessary for comparison. The 
output can be represented graphically on an Iris plot, 
which facilitates examination of the interaction of the 
regulator with the regulated entities. It provides a method 
of identifying attestation differences, and allowing for 
systematic and holistic examination of the technical 
lifecycle. The Iris plots also create a platform for dialogue 
that promotes recognition. It is acknowledged that it is 
difficult to quantitatively address the suitability of the 
PBP Bow-Tie models; however, the use of the models in 
identifying the areas to focus on in this recognition effort 
has demonstrated the qualitative benefits of the PBP Bow-
Tie assessments.
The PBP Bow-Tie model assessment is flexible, and with 
appropriate education on its derivation, along with the Iris plot 
illustrations, is capable of concisely conveying information. 
It can be utilized to provide a platform for inter-agency 
(mutual) recognition of regulatory findings and processes. 
It is also a method for self-examination, highlighting areas 
in which there is little regulator interaction. Both the ADF 
and NZDF utilized the PBP Bow-Tie model for this, and it 
provided a platform for successful recognition between 
the two countries, overcoming the unknown compliance 
with the EMARs, and providing for wider recognition, than 
the limited recognition activities already carried out using 
the EDA established EMAD-R process. The PBP Bow-Tie 
assessment has subsequently been included in the ASIC. 
In addition, this process is able to streamline the standard 
mutual recognition, and will inform all future recognitions, 
based on this successful demonstration of the ability of the 
assessment models to identify areas for recognition within 
the EMAD-R process, currently undertaken by the MAAs, 
both in terms of time, and effort.
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